Cross-Canada Appellate Cases
The constitutional cases listed below have been gathered over the last six months from Canadian Courts of Appeal. These cases demonstrate how Charter questions are being litigated today and many are in the process of being appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Alberta Court of Appeal
Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, 2009 ABCA 403 An order certifying class proceedings for recovery of charges by long term care facilities from the province of Alberta and nine Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) was upheld. The province of Alberta and the RHAs administer the regime under the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-20, the Nursing Homes Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. N-7 and the Hospitals Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-12. The Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, stipulates restrictions on federal funding to health related services. The trial judge did not err in finding that there exists a cause of action for ultra vires legislation and action, as this argument depends on a plausible interpretation of “accommodation and meals” in the relevant statutory scheme. Also, the trial judge did not err in finding that there exists a cause of action for as s.15 Charter breach (arising because of imposition of any accommodation charge, or alternately imposition of charges for services other than “accommodation and meals.”) It is arguable that the set of facts in this case could align with Nova Scotia (Workers Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504. It is arguable that EAAS should have public interest standing for this Charter claim. The collection of the full amount or part of the accommodation and meals charge in this case involves the collection of money by the government. It is therefore arguable that this case would fall within the exception defined in Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, and that section 24(1) of the Charter may apply. The trial decision that a claim for restitution arising from an ultra vires tax had no hope of success was upheld as the charges did not meet the basic indicia of a tax as defined in Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134. Leave to appeal to the SCC granted, 2010 S.C.C.A. 27.
R. v. Gomboc, 2009 ABCA 276 At issue in this case is whether the use of a digital recording ammeter (“DRA”) in the absence of a prior judicial authorization constitutes an unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Warrants based solely on tainted information are invalid. However, if the warrant would have issued without the tainted information, it remains valid, although a s.24(2) analysis could still be necessary if a sufficient temporal connection exists between the Charter breach and the evidence gathered following that breach. Assuming that the search warrant is valid in the absence of the DRA evidence, the parties would then be able to marshal evidence and make submissions on whether a s.24(2) analysis is triggered, and if so, to make submissions on the application of s.24(2) in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in R. v. Grant and R. v. Harrison. Appeal allowed and new trial ordered. Leave to appeal sought. Heard by SCC May, 2010, judgment reserved.
R. v. Nixon, 2009 ABCA 269 Before a guilty plea was entered, the Attorney General withdrew the agreement after his office determined that the plea resolution agreement was not in the best interests of the administration of justice. The trial judge held that that repudiation of the plea resolution agreement in the
circumstances resulted in an abuse of process and was a breach of the respondent's s. 7 right to security of the person under the Charter. As a result, he issued an order directing the Crown to accept a plea to careless driving. The issues on appeal were 1. Is the withdrawal of a plea resolution agreement a matter of prosecutorial discretion? 2. If so, was the withdrawal here a breach of s. 7 as an abuse of process? The court held that the trial judge used the wrong legal test to distinguish between matters that fall within the scope of prosecutorial discretion and those more properly characterized as a prosecutor’s tactics and conduct before the court. Applying the correct test, the decision of the Attorney General to repudiate the plea agreement fell squarely within the core elements of prosecutorial discretion. On the second question, repudiation of a plea resolution agreement amounts to an abuse of process only in exceptional cases when done unfairly, or when Crown discretion is exercised irrationally, unreasonably or oppressively. The ADM’s conduct, viewed in its totality, cannot be characterized as unfair, unreasonable, oppressive or irrational. The high threshold to find abuse of process has not been met here. Appeal Allowed. Judgment set aside. Leave to appeal sought. Leave to appeal granted by Supreme Court.
R. v. Ngai, 2010 ABCA 10 A question arose regarding whether police use of a digital recording ammeter (DRA) infringed s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as it was used to reveal electricity usage patterns common to marijuana grow operations, prior to obtaining a search warrant for the property. The trial decision, that there was no infringement of s. 8 resulting from warrantless seizure of DRA information, was delivered prior to the decision in R. v. Gomboc, 2009 ABCA 276, where if was found that information in a DRA gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy (a decision on the Crown’s appeal to the SCC is pending May 19, 2010). In Ngai, the Crown conceded that there was a warrantless seizure resulting in a breach of s. 8; however in a s. 24(2) analysis based on the approach used in R. v. Grant, 2009 S.C.C 32, the ABCA found the DRA evidence to be admissible as the police conduct was not egregious, the data was not at the biographical core of personal information, and the data was “strong, cogent, reliable evidence” which supported a societal interest in seeking the truth. Ngai’s appeal was dismissed.
L.C. v Alberta, 2010 ABCA 14/ C.H.S. v. Alberta, 2010 ABCA 15 The appeals in these concurrent decisions challenged the chambers judges’ decisions to strike pleadings that alleged civil liability against child welfare officials resulting from the Director’s failure to file a plan of care after obtaining a temporary guardianship order (TGO), as was required by the Child Welfare Act, S.A. 1984, c. C-8.1. Claims for constitutional torts were permitted under s. 7, and s. 9, provided pleadings were amended to identify a willful disregard for the appellants’ Charter rights, or intent to violate those rights. (The law does not (yet) require demonstration of bad faith, abuse of power, or tortuous conduct in order to receive damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter, Ward v. Vancouver (City), 2009 BCCA 23, 265 B.C.A.C. 174, leave to appeal granted [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 125 (QL).) Claims under ss. 2(a), 12, 15 were struck from the proceedings.
Lavallee v. Alberta, 2010 ABCA 48 Ss. 29(e) and (f) of the Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4, do not oblige the Alberta Securities Commission to consider evidence regardless of that evidence’s probative value, its prejudicial effect, or its reliability. The Commission retains the discretion to receive evidence. The court ruled in obiter dicta that even in absence of this discretion s. 7 and 11 would not be infringed in a way to render these subsections of the Securities Act inoperative. S. 11 does not apply to administrative hearings that are “primarily intended to maintain discipline, professional integrity, and professional standards, or to regulate conduct within a limited private sphere of activity”. The considerable fines faced by the appellants were not penal sanctions, rather they were reflective of the legislative intent to ensure that the protection of the public interest. These fines represented purely economic interests and so could not engage s. 7 protection. Similarly, the difficulties and stresses of this particular litigation engage could not engage constitutional protection as securities proceedings are not analogous to “an overlong and vexatious criminal trial or proceedings initiated to remove a child from parental care”. Leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed.
R. v. Warren, 2010 ABCA 133/ R. v. C.L.B., 2010 ABCA 134 Sections 490.019 and 490.02(1) of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 relating to the obligation to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (SOIRA), are not contrary to of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite their impugned retrospective1 application. In both cases the appellant had been sentenced prior to the enactment of the SOIRA. In Warren, the court considered s. 7, and in C.L.B. the court considered ss. 11(h) and (i). The SOIRA regime does not offend s. 7 as there is no violation of a principle of fundamental justice. A SOIRA order is a retrospective consequence of conviction rather than a retroactive punishment. Also, statutes defining processes that do not constitute punishment can apply retrospectively, or retroactively, without violating the principles of fundamental justice. Because retrospective registration does not constitute punishment, a SOIRA order cannot violate 11(h), or 11(i). The finding that the SOIRA regime does not violate ss. 7, 11(h), or 11(i) of the Charter was consistent with preceding decisions in other Canadian Appellate courts.
R. v. Devera, 2010 ABCA 154 New trial ordered where appellant's right to a fair trial pursuant to s. 11(d) of the Charter was breached. Attempts had been made to commence proceedings for 18 months; however the accused was unable to retain counsel. The trial judge mis-exercised his discretion when he refused to grant a further adjournment for what would likely have been a maximum period of less than three months. He did not balance the consequences of further delay with the interests of justice and the possible impacts on the complainants of cross-examination by those accused of brutalizing them. A minimal attempt should have been made.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (AG), 2010 BCCA 15 In the majority judgment, Huddart J. ruled that ss. 4(1) and 5(1) of The Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), do not apply to the Vancouver Safe Injection Site (Insite) by reason of the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, and that "if interjurisdictional immunity is not available to a provincial undertaking on the facts of this case, then it may well be said the doctrine is not reciprocal and can never be applied to protect exclusive provincial powers." Undisputed evidence supported the contention that supervised injection was "a vital part of a provincial health care undertaking". A supervised drug injection service did not frustrate federal purposes of protecting health and eliminating a market for drug import, trafficking, or production, and so federal paramountcy could not apply. Rowles J. concurred on the application of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. In addition, she found that the application of ss. 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA to Insite, operating as it does in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, would engage each of the s. 7 interests of life, liberty and security of the person of the personal respondents in the PHS action and others similarly situated and, further, that such application would not accord with the principles of fundamental justice because of overbreadth. Smith J., in dissent, ruled that the doctrine of federal paramountcy should apply rather than that of interjurisdictional immunity and that while there was a deprivation of life, liberty, and security of the person this was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Leave to appeal, and to cross appeal granted by the SCC.
Armstrong v. British Columbia (Ministry of Health), 2010 BCCA 56 Prima facie case of discrimination not established in British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal claim regarding lack of funding for prostate cancer screening test. In addition to applying the O'Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, test for a prima facie case of discrimination the Chambers judge applied the test outlined in Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. However this application was of no consequence as it did not require Mr. Armstrong to prove a breach of s. 15 of the Charter in addition to proving a prima facie case of discrimination. Leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed.
McIvor v. Canada, 2010 BCCA 168 Extension to suspension of a declaration of invalidity granted to government where ss. 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(c) of The Indian Act had previously been found to be of no force and effect as they infringed s. 15 of the Charter without justification under s. 1. Due process was followed in order to implement new legislation, however the implementation was delayed by the prorogation of Parliament in December 2009. The application for extension was unopposed. Application for leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 234.
Global BC, A Division of Canwest Media Inc. v. British Columbia, 2010 BCCA 169 The trial judge erred in considering that little would be gained by release of video and transcript evidence of a confession of murder in a staged "crime boss" operation while determining if a publication ban on the video and transcript evidence should remain in place. The appropriate test, as outlined in R. v. Mentuck, [2001] SCC 76, is whether a serious danger could be avoided by declining to permit publication. The public has a strong interest in open debate of general police tactics. The identity of undercover officers was ordered to be protected by removal from the video prior to publication, to the satisfaction of the officers and the crown.
Arkinstall v. City of Surrey 2010 BCCA 250 Sections 18(1) and 19.3(1) of the Safety Standards Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 39 [SSA], violate s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the extent that they authorize the warrantless entry and inspection of residential premises for the regulatory purpose of inspecting electrical systems for safety risks that may be related to grow-op operations. Within a person's home there is a high expectation of privacy and so such inspections are intrusive. The legislative requirement of "reasonable grounds" for an inspection does not render the inspections reasonable for the purposes of s. 8. The regulatory regime would not be made inefficient with a warrant requirement.
Actton Transport Ltd. v. British Columbia (Employment Standards), 2010 BCCA 272 The appellant transport companies claimed that the Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 133 was not applicable to them as they were a federally regulated enterprise, and therefore the Director of Employment Standards lacked jurisdiction to order payment of overtime benefits as directed by the Act. The tribunal and trial judge were correct in establishing that supplying labour and services to a local garbage business is not vital to the interprovincial trucking business. The appeal from the BC Supreme Court decision, which held that the Tribunal did not err in finding that the drivers' employment fell under provincial jurisdiction or in dismissing Actton's claim for relief, was dismissed.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. et al. v. The Queen, 2010 NBCA 35 The province was suing several tobacco companies for damages associated with the provision of health care services to those who smoked over the years and had entered into a contingency fee agreement with its lawyers that provided for a payment of 12 to 22 percent of any settlement received to the lawyers, depending on the stage the litigation reached. Appeal by the companies from dismissal of their motion to disqualify the Province's lawyers and for an order prohibiting any lawyer from acting for the Province on a contingency basis was upheld. The conclusion of the contingent fee agreement by the Attorney General of New Brunswick was not contrary to s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and ss. 23 and 61 of the Financial Administration Act.
New Brunswick HRC v. Province of New Brunswick (Department of Social Development), 2010 NBCA 40 A complaint alleging a breach of s. 6 mobility rights as outlined in the Charter could not be brought by the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission, where the initial complaint was brought by parents of an autistic man alleging a breach of s. 5 of the Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11. The complainant was not being denied services available to the public or being discriminated against with respect to public services because of mental disability. The unstated premise for the appeal by the Human Rights Commission was the economic implications of a service being provided in the State of Maine when it could be funded in Fredericton at the same cost.
R. v. Martin, 2010 NBCA 41 Wire tap evidence should not have been excluded at trial under Charter s. 24(2) despite the finding of a violation of Charter s. 8. Exclusion of evidence in the particular circumstances would bring the administration of justice into disrepute as outlined in R. v. Grant, [2009] SCC 32. A wiretap monitor had missed the initial part of a discussion where the respondent identified himself as a lawyer, and only heard a portion of the conversation in which Mr. Martin counseled someone "to dispose of items which could afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence". The investigating officer overstepped the bounds of his authority when he listened to a communication that should have been sealed as soon as it was discovered that the conversation involved a lawyer. The acquittal at trial was overturned and a new trial was ordered.
Newfoundland & Labrador Court of Appeal
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission v. Halifax, 2010 NSCA 8 A Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission (HRC) Board of Inquiry was reinstated where the proceedings by the Board had been prohibited by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for lack of jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction did not meet the test of being "clear and beyond doubt". The complainant had alleged discrimination against him as a person of Acadian descent. Extra taxes were paid to finance special project for schools in his area, while the French schools that his children attended received no such benefit. Leave to appeal submitted to the SCC.
Ontario Court of Appeal
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 2009 ONCA 59 The dissent in this appeal held that the mandatory publication ban on bail proceedings contained in s. 517 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, when requested by an accused, violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1. This was based on a finding that the provision failed at the third branch of the proportionality test. While the Court agreed that the mandatory publication ban violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1, this was because the provision was overly broad in its scope, thereby failing the rational connection and minimal impairment tests. UPDATE: The OCA decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 2010 SCC 21: the constitutionality of s. 517 of the Criminal Code was upheld.
Canada (Attorney General) v. Godbout, 2009 ONCA 835 The question of when the acknowledged infringement of a Canadian citizen’s s. 6 rights by his extradition to a foreign country is justified under s. 1 of the Charter is a fact-specific inquiry. That inquiry is largely a political assessment powered in part by an appreciation of Canada’s international obligations. The factors referred to by the Minister in his letter indicating that the applicant would be ordered surrendered were all properly taken into account by the Minister on the s. 6 inquiry. The weight to be assigned to the various factors was a matter primarily for the Minister and not for the court. Appeal Dismissed.
Jackson v. Vaughan (City), 2010 ONCA 118 The ONCA upheld a trial decision that Vaugan By-laws No. 228-2008 and No. 205-2008 , which authorized the commencement of legal proceedings against the appellant Mayor of Vaughan regarding her campaign spending, were not unconstitutionally vague, and that s. 7 of the Charter is not engaged by s. 81 of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32 because a compliance audit of campaign finances is regulatory rather than criminal or quasi-criminal in nature.
Montague v. The Queen, 2010 ONCA 141 A motion challenging the constitutional validity of various of the firearms provisions of the Criminal Code, the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 and related firearms regulations failed as the SCC has ruled in R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84, and R. v Hasselwander, 1993 SCC 90, that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not protect or guarantee use of arms. Leave to appeal submitted to the SCC.
R. v. Raham, 2010 ONCA 206 Stunt driving as defined in s. 3(7) and punishable under s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 is not an absolute liability offence and so although the offence is punishable by imprisonment it is not unconstitutional for being contrary to s. 7 of the Charter. Because of the presumption in favour of a constitutional interpretation, the offence charged against the respondent will be interpreted as a strict liability offence where this can reasonably be done, even if it could also reasonably be interpreted as an absolute liability offence. The Legislature is taken to have accepted the availability of the due diligence defence when they increased the penal stakes for speeding at 50 km per hour or more by including the risk of incarceration. There is no clear language excluding the due diligence defence. Acquittal at trial overturned.
R v. Quenneville, 2010 ONCA 223 A failure to undertake an inquiry to ensure that consent to a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder was voluntary and informed (similar to an inquiry provided by s. 606(1.1) for those pleading guilty) does not violate rights under s.. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The relevant principle of fundamental justice was that a person who was not criminally responsible at the time of the offence should not be convicted. There is no counterpart principle that a person who is criminally responsible be exempted from being found NCRMD. The finding of NCRMD depended on the court concluding on the balancing of probabilities that the criteria of s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code had been met rather than the consent of the accused. Those seeking a NCRMD verdict were not treated differently from those seeking to plead guilty on an enumerated or analogous ground. Neither procedure discriminated on the basis of mental disability.
R. v. Jenkins, 2010 ONCA 278 Decision upheld the constitutionality of s. 54(1)(a) of the Provincial Offences Act, which permits ex parte trials even in circumstances where there is a possibility of incarceration. There was no violation of s. 7 or s. 11(d) of the Charter. The defendant has a right to trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. The Act does not restrict this right, rather it provides a mechanism for proceeding with a trial where the defendant does not avail him or herself of the right to appear at that trial. Application for Leave to Appeal submitted to the SCC.
McHale v. Ontario (AG), 2010 ONCA 361 There is no constitutional conflict between the provincial Crown Attorneys Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.49 and federal Criminal Code provisions ss. 504 and 507.1, which are applicable to initiation and conduct of private prosecutions of indictable offences. Crown counsel was incorrect to withdraw the information sworn by McHale not because of lack of authority but rather because McHale, as a private informant, had a right to have a judge listen to his allegations and evidence and decide whether there was evidence of the essential elements of the offence charged.
R. v. Prokofiew, 2010 ONCA 423 Section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act does not preclude a trial judge from instructing a jury that an accused's silence at trial cannot be used as evidence of guilt. However, the failure of a trial judge to give such an instruction does not constitute reversible error where the appellant cannot show a real risk that his or her silence was misused. The trial judge made it clear that lack of evidence could give rise to a reasonable doubt. The accused was charged with conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada, and of defrauding the Government of Canada of about $3.25 million for participation in a scheme involving the fictitious sale of heavy equipment to Generate HST that was not remitted to the federal government as required. Leave to appeal submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada.
R. v. Tran, 2010 ONCA 471 Charter remedy of a reduced sentence was overturned and replaced with a stay of proceedings as state misconduct was egregious to the point where a breach of ss. 7 and 12 Charter rights jeopardized the perception of trial fairness and brought the integrity of law enforcement into disrepute. The trial judge erred in law by holding that a stay should not be granted where evidence was not affected and charges of home invasion were serious. Tran, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, was assaulted by two police officers, who later delayed medical attention and committed perjury in the attempted cover up. The two officers were permitted by the Crown to remain in court to assist with the prosecution until ordered otherwise by the trial judge.
PEI Court of Appeal
Ayangama v. Eastern School Board 2010 PECA 2/3 The burden of proof for a claim under s. 15 of the Charter differs from that of a claim of discrimination under the PEI Human Rights Act. Under the Human Rights Act there is no limitation that the discrimination must be caused by the application or operation of law, as there is for a claim made under s. 15 of the Charter. The motions judge was correct to not submit a summary judgment for a s. 15 claim based on the Human Rights Commission finding of discrimination in the school board's hiring practices.
Quebec Court of Appeal
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
R. v. Besharah, 2010 SKCA 2 Where the lawfulness of a police arrest is put at issue on a Charter challenge, the onus must fall on the Crown through police witnesses to establish that the police had subjectively and objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, for, as a practical matter, this proposition is asserted and relied upon by the Crown and is within the peculiar knowledge of the police. Thus, fairness requires that the burden of proving this must fall on the Crown and that the accused has an opportunity to challenge the police evidence by way of cross-examination. This logic applies where the police have justified a search of the accused as a search incident to arrest, whether or not the accused has also challenged the lawfulness of the arrest pursuant to s. 9 of the Charter. While it is true that search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the general rule that a warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable, it is for the Crown to establish that the pre-requisites for the exception have been satisfied. Appeal Dismissed.
Whatcott v. Saskatchewan (HRT), 2010 SKCA 26 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturned a finding by the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal that four flyers distributed by the Christian Truth Activists did "promote hatred against individuals because of their sexual orientation" and therefore violated s. 14(1)(b) of The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code (The Code). While many would find the flyers "crude, offensive, or pejorative", the statements made within did not meet the standard of hatred, i.e. detestation, calumny and vilification, as defined in Canada v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892. Furthermore it is insufficient that particular words or phrases meet the requisite standard of hatred. The communication must also be evaluated in the context in which it was made, and with respect to s. 14(2) which protects freedom of expression. The court found that this particular context was an ongoing public debate about the morality of certain sexual behaviours, and thus suppression of the flyers would not be a justifiable limitation on freedom of expression. Charter ss. 2(a) and 2(b) arguments advanced by parties were not addressed as judgment was made on basis of The Code. Application for leave to appeal submitted to the SCC.
Yukon Court of Appeal
Federal Court of Appeal
Ray v. Canada 2010 FCA 17 Appeal from decision of the Tax Court of Canada that medical expense tax credits would be disallowed where the purchase of vitamins, herbs, natural foods, and other substances was not recorded by a pharmacist as required by paragraph 118.2(2)(n2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1(5th) Supp. Appellant argued that paragraph 118.2(2)(n) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The FCA found that paragraph 118.2(2)(n) was not discriminatory in either purpose or effect. The s. 15 argument presented by the appellant was that R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, relieved claimants from establishing that benefits sought must be provided by law. This argument is more appropriately addressed by the SCC as it was already rejected by the FCA in Ali v. The Queen, 2008 FCA 190. The s. 7 argument was also rejected based on a previous decision (Matthew v. Canada, 2003 FCA 371). Application for leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed.
Bernard v. Canada AG 2010 FCA 40 The Public Service Labour Relations Board determination that an employee must provide a home address and home phone number was challenged as a violation of privacy rights and constitutional right to freedom of association. The Board erred in declining to exercise its jurisdiction and not considering the privacy rights of individuals manifestly not represented by the parties. Matter remitted to the Board for re-determination.
International Pentecostal Ministry Fellowship of Toronto v. Canada (National Revenue) 2010 FCA 51 Appellant charity had charitable status revoked by the Respondent Ministry for noncompliance with the Income Tax Act. The argument that the action was ultra vires the federal parliament failed because although regulation of charities is within provincial authority under s. 92(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867, taxation falls within federal authority under subsection 91(3), and therefore the Respondent acted within jurisdiction.